20 Quotes & Sayings By Jacques Derrida

Jacques Derrida (November 15, 1930 – July 18, 2004) was a French philosopher. He is one of the major voices in contemporary philosophy. His work is noted for its breadth and intensity, his frequent use of metaphor, for its engagement with issues of language and linguistics, and for its attention to questions of power and philosophy. Derrida was the son of Jewish parents who lived in Algeria Read more

His father committed suicide in 1942 after being tortured by the Vichy French government. His family moved to Paris in 1945 where he began his studies at the Lycee Louis-le-Grand. Derrida graduated in 1952 from the Sorbonne with a degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics.

He received his doctorate from the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in 1961. He taught at several universities in France, including the University of Paris III - Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris Descartes University. He was appointed professor at the University of California, Berkeley in 1985, where he remained until his death in 2004. He was visiting professor at Yale University in 1976. He also served as visiting professor or lecturer at numerous universities around the world including Johns Hopkins University (2001), Stanford (1990), University of Chicago (1986), London School of Economics (1984), Princeton (1980), University of Sydney (1981), University College London (1966), Texas A&M University (1970).

He also delivered the prestigious Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh (1987). Though he officially retired from teaching, he continued working on his books until shortly before his death. Derrida died on July 18, 2004 at Auxerre Hospital due to heart failure caused by lymphatic leukemia; he was 66 years old. His funeral took place on July 22 at Le Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris.

The memorial service included readings by Tony Kushner and Amiri Baraka which were followed by a musical tribute provided by members of Kronos Quartet led by David Harrington and featuring performers Michelle DuBarryt alto saxophone, Xavier Charles-Dupont tenor saxophone, Katerina Papathanasiou soprano saxophone, Imani Winds flute, Catherine Harnois clarinet flute, Matthieu Cerna trumpet trombone, Guillaume Czapez violin , Simon Mouton piano , Jonathan Bergeron cello . Derrida died the same

1
The poet…is the man of metaphor: while the philosopher is interested only in the truth of meaning, beyond even signs and names, and the sophist manipulates empty signs…the poet plays on the multiplicity of signifieds. Jacques Derrida
2
But because me and myself, as you no doubt are well aware, we are going to die, my relation–and yours too–to the event of this text, which otherwise never quite makes it, our relation is that of a structurally posthumous necessity. Suppose, in that case, that I am not alone in my claim to know the idiomatic code (whose notion itself is already contradictory) of this event. What if somewhere, here or there, there are shares in this non-secret’s secret? Even so the scene would not be changed. The accomplices, as you are once again well aware, are also bound to die. . Jacques Derrida
3
And still the text will remain, if it is really cryptic and parodying (and I tell you that it is so through and through. I might as well tell you since it won’t be of any help to you. Even my admission can very well be a lie because there is dissimulation only if one tells the truth, only if one tells that one is telling the truth), still the text will remain indefinitely open, cryptic and parodying. Jacques Derrida
4
In general, I try and distinguish between what one calls the Future and “l’avenir” [the ‘to come]. The future is that which — tomorrow, later, next century — will be. There is a future which is predictable, programmed, scheduled, foreseeable. But there is a future, l’avenir (to come) which refers to someone who comes whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future. That which is totally unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future, beyond the other known future, it is l’avenir in that it is the coming of the Other when I am completely unable to foresee their arrival. Jacques Derrida
5
A text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance, the law of its composition and the rules of its game. A text remains, moreover, forever imperceptible. Its laws and rules are not, however, harbored in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply that they can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could rigorously be called a perception. Jacques Derrida
6
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense of this opposition), as a small or large unity, can be cited, put between quotation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that there are only contexts without any center of absolute anchoring. This citationality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is not an accident or anomaly, but is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could no longer even have a so-called “normal” functioning. What would a mark be that one could not cite? And whose origin could not be lost on the way?. Jacques Derrida
7
Therefore we will not listen to the source itself in order to learn what it is or what it means, but rather to the turns of speech, the allegories, figures, metaphors, as you will, into which the source has deviated, in order to lose it or rediscover it–which always amounts to the same. Jacques Derrida
8
It goes without saying that these effects do not suffice to annul the necessity for a “change of terrain.” It also goes without saying that the choice between these two forms of deconstruction cannot be simple and unique. A new writing must weave and interlace these two motifs of deconstruction. Which amounts to saying that one must speak several languages and produce several texts at once. I would like to point out especially that the style of the first deconstruction is mostly that of the Heideggerian questions, and the other is mostly the one which dominates France today. I am purposely speaking in terms of a dominant style: because there are also breaks and changes of terrain in texts of the Heideggerian type; because the “change of terrain” is far from upsetting the entire French landscape to which I am referring; because what we need, perhaps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of “style”; and if there is style, Nietzsche reminded us, it must be plural. Jacques Derrida
9
Let us being again. To take some examples: why should “literature” still designate that which already breaks away from literature–away from what has always been conceived and signified under that name–or that which, not merely escaping literature, implacably destroys it? (Posed in these terms, the question would already be caught in the assurance of a certain fore-knowledge: can “what has always been conceived and signified under that name” be considered fundamentally homogeneous, univocal, or nonconflictual?) To take other examples: what historical and strategic function should henceforth be assigned to the quotation marks, whether visible or invisible, which transform this into a “book, ” or which still make the deconstruction of philosophy into a “philosophical discourse”? . Jacques Derrida
10
For the same reason there is nowhere to begin to trace the sheaf or the graphics of differance. For what is put into question is precisely the quest for a rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal responsibility. The problematic of writing is opened by putting into question the value of the arkhe. What I will propose here will not be elaborated simply as a philosophical discourse, operating according to principles, postulates, axioms, or definitions, and proceeding along the discursive lines of a linear order of reasons. In the delineation of differance everything is strategic and adventurous. Strategic because no transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can govern theologically the totality of the field. Adventurous because this strategy is a not simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients tactics according to a final goal, a telos or theme of domination, a mastery and ultimate reappropriation of the development of the field. Finally, a strategy without finality, what might be called blind tactics, or empirical wandering if the value of empiricism did not itself acquire its entire meaning in opposition to philosophical responsibility. If there is a certain wandering in the tracing of differance, it no more follows the lines of philosophical-logical discourse than that of its symmetrical and integral inverse, empirical-logical discourse. The concept of play keeps itself beyond this opposition, announcing, on the eve of philosophy and beyond it, the unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end. . Jacques Derrida
11
Still less, despite appearances, will it have been a collection of three “essays” whose itinerary it would be time, after the fact, to recognize; whose continuity and underlying laws could now be pointed out; indeed, whose overall concept or meaning could at last, with all the insistence required on such occasions, be squarely set forth. I will not feign, according to the code, either premeditation or improvisation. These texts are assembled otherwise; it is not my intention here to present them. Jacques Derrida
What cannot be said above all must not be silenced...
12
What cannot be said above all must not be silenced but written. Jacques Derrida
I always dream of a pen that would be a...
13
I always dream of a pen that would be a syringe. Jacques Derrida
14
These two poles, the unconditional and the conditional, are absolutely heterogeneous, and must remain irreducible to one another. They are nonetheless indissociable: if one wants, and it is necessary, forgiveness to become effective, concrete, historic; if one wants it to arrive, to happen by changing things, it is necessary that this purity engage itself in a series of conditions of all kinds (psychosociological, political, etc.). It is between these two poles, irreconcilable but indissociable, that decisions and responsibilities are to be taken. Yet despite all the confusions which reduce forgiveness to amnesty or to amnesia, to acquittal or prescription, to the work of mourning or some political therapy of reconciliation, in short to some historical ecology, it must never be forgotten, nevertheless, that all of that refers to a certain idea of pure and unconditional forgiveness, without which this discourse would not have the least meaning. What complicates the question of ‘meaning’ is again what I suggested a moment ago: pure and unconditional forgiveness, in order to have its own meaning, must have no ‘meaning’, no finality, even no intelligibility. It is a madness of the impossible. Jacques Derrida
15
I remain ‘torn’ (between a ‘hyberbolic’ ethical vision of forgiveness, pure forgiveness, and the reality of a society at work in pragmatic processes of reconciliation). But without power, desire, or need to decide. The two poles are irreducible to one another, certainly, but they remain indissociable. In order to inflect politics, or what you just called the ‘pragmatic processes’, in order to change the law (which, thus, finds itself between the two poles, the ‘ideal’ and the ‘empirical’ — and what is more important to me here is, between these two, this universalising mediation, this history of the law, the possibility of this progress of the law), it is necessary to refer to a ‘“hyperbolic” ethical vision of forgiveness’. Even if I were not sure of the words ‘vision’ or ‘ethics’ in this case, let us say that only this inflexible exigence can orient a history of laws, and evolution of the law. It alone can inspire here, now, in the urgency, without waiting, response and responsibilities. Jacques Derrida
16
To pretend, I actually do the thing: I have therefore only pretended to pretend. Jacques Derrida
17
Contrary to what phenomenology–which is always phenomenology of perception–has tried to make us believe, contrary to what our desire cannot fail to be tempted into believing, the thing itself always escapes. Jacques Derrida
18
Monsters cannot be announced. One cannot say: 'Here are our monsters, ' without immediately turning the monsters into pets. Jacques Derrida
19
The circle of the return to birth can only remain open, but this is a chance, a sign of life, and a wound. Jacques Derrida